we create a distinction between] before and after [separated] by one and the same instant. 2 The instant, in other words, is the infinitessimal pause poised between the segments of temporal succession, pictured as a line: and as such it is "nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness."
3 A familiar story in the history of thinking about time, but Bachelard was one of the first to take it to severe task. He did so by reconsidering the character of the instant. For him, instants are no mere abstractions or formal "cuts" in time's implacable flow; they are instead powderlike sparks that have their own creative force. Rather than being punctuations in the slow-moving morraine of durée réelle -positions where nothing happens --they are where time's action is to be found and where change of any significant sort is located. Much as Kierkegaard had proposed the Moment as the existentially disruptive undoing of the World Spirit in Hegel -for whom the instant is just as abstract as it is for Bergson -so Bachelard affirms the instant as the deconstructive worm in the cordial heart of Bergsonian duration.
In both cases, the rebellious actions of the obstreperous son against the prepossessing father were effective and timely. The Kierkegaardian Augenblick and Bachlardian instant both act to unravel the mantle of their most eminent philosophical forebears.
Power politics aside, let us attend to the instant as conceived by Bachelard with an eye to its edge-like properties. What is this instant like? What is its real revolutionary potential? Here I shall be brief as my two fellow panelists have already escorted you into its midst and begun to explore its fecund potential.
II
Bachelard's basis thesis in L'intuition de l'instant is that "the instant is the truly specific character of time." 4 By the Aristotelian locution "specific character,"
Bachelard means that which distinguishes time itself -gives to it its definitive nature. At first glance, this would seem to put Bachelard into the same camp as those who, from Aristotle to Descartes, claim that time is composed of instants or "nows" posited as formal, ennumeratable atomic units of the flow of time, together constituting what Heidegger came to call the "succession of nows" (die Jetztfolge) in Being and Time. In the eyes of critics of this earlier tradition, instants conceived in this manner are artificially generated by imaginary cuts or impositions -in any case, do not belong intrinsically to time itself but are artifices or constructions wrought upon it. Heidegger argues that the now-series belongs to world-time, not to time as we experience it, and William James speaks of the "knife-edge" of the now, thereby indicating that one sense of edge, that belonging to a tool for cutting, is an appropriate image for the instant in its Aristotelian or Cartesian avatars. 5 The rigor and precision of the knife-edge materializes the idea of the instant as sheer incision in time's flow.
4 Gaston Bachelard, L'intution de l'instant (Paris: Gonthier, 1966), p. 2. Hereafter II. 5 The classical passage in James is this: "The practically cognizedpresent is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time." (William James, The Principles of Psychology [New York: Dover, 1950] , I, 609)
The difficulties with the classical and early modern idea of the edge as like a surgical cut are well known: it is utterly arbitrary (given that the flow of time has its own rhythm and pace), and it ignores the fact that time is not something that can be cut or strictly semented in the first place. Moreover, it is questionable whether Aristotle or Descartes ever held such a view -or anyone else for that matter: the Jetztfolge may itself be a myth devised by Heidegger as a foil against which to pose his own idea of temporal ecstases. 6 Bachelard, ignoring these various difficulties, has his own contention to make. This is that the instant --far from being the product of arbitrary intervention, a mere artefact of the spirit of calculation -is, quite to the contrary, the source of novelty in human experience.
Thus he speaks of "the élan fournished by the radical novelty of instants" (II, 65).
More strongly still, he maintains that the novel and the instantaneous co-imply each other: not only is it the case that "novelty is clearly always instantaneous"( II, 31), but the instant itself is always novel -forever new, always different, unremissibly other than any other instant, including the instant that precedes the present instant. In sort, the instant offers "an absolute beginning"( II, 66: "un commencement absolu"). By this Bachelard means not just that no instant can repeat another instant in its content or character but that each instant represents a radical new start -is "aboriginal," ab origo. It launches a new event in the history of the world, setting it out to develop on its own. This event comes from nowhere, even if it going somewhere from that moment on. Bachelard here provides a miniaturized model of cosmogenesis ex nihilo.
6 I owe this last contention to my colleague Peter Manchester. See his magisterial treatment of the issue in The Syntax of Time.
The result of such eruptive instantanteousness is the radical discontinuity of time: "rather than the continuity of life [as in Bergson] , it is the discontinuity of birth that calls for explication... discontinuous time" ( II, 67) . Such time carries a strong factor of the "accidental" (II, 24); but it is not merely a matter of chance dispersion, for it betrays a "freedom of the possible" (II, 67) that is the other side of novelty, which is always a foray into the far side of the possible. This freedom is such that it pervades even the realm of habitual behavior, which incorporates novelty into its re-enactments and is thus not a matter of sheer repetition: habit (habitude) is "the synthesis of novelty and routine, and this synthesis is realized by fecund instants" ( II, 65) , with the results that habit is "like the routinized assimilation of novelty"( II, 64). Since habit is normally taken to be an expression of duration -we speak naturally of habits as "enduring" -it follows that duration itself is only a collocation of instants: "Duration, habit, and progress are only the grouping together of instants, [and as such] Let us explore this parallel in some detail.
To start with, we must distinguish two basic edge-types, namely, borders and boundaries:
(i) borders: in their precision as well as in their arbitrary imposition, borders resemble rigidly delimited nows. For borders are normally considered in advance of and outside a given natural circumstance. I am thinking of phenomena like "border-lines," which are often the precipitates of a treaty or other political agreement -in short, a convention that is established in advance of its application. Such lines are as determinate as "now-points," Husserl's term for the reduction of an experienced now with its retentional and protentional horizons to a mere punctum. In classical Euclidean geometry, a line is a collection of points: thus the affiliation of border-line and now-point is built into an ancient vocabulary of spatial representation. Each also contributes to the constitution of surfaces, spatial and temporal respectively. These surfaces have edges -formal limits that signify where a given surface begins and ends: where it "drops off" into empty space.
Characteristic of all these phenomena are their indefinite divisibility (we can subdivide a point ad infinitum into lesser points, and the same is true for lines and surfaces) and, at the same time, their de facto invisibility. We shall never observe a now-point as such, nor a border-line on the ground: they possess the intransigent abstractness that Hegel attributed to the "This,"the "Now," and "Here" in the chapter on sense-certainty in The Phenomenology of Spirit. That is to say, they cannot be understood concretely in their own terms, but require the supplementation of perception and history if they are to become the genuine contents of actual experience. The "border" that is discussed in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo, though perfectly clear at the level of language and numerical measurement, is not the border that immigrants feel in their bodies as they desperately attempt to cross into the United States: this border is not a line drawn upon the arid earth of the region, it is a separative force that is not measured in meters or miles but in human perspiration and exhaustion. Just as the "now" at stake in saying "now is the time to cross the border in the dark of night" is not captured on any clock but is no less decisively felt by those who take action in its name: "now, right now let us get a move on..."
(ii) boundaries. In contrast with borders, boundaries are permeable; they are porous, full of holes; they allow, indeed often invite, movement across them.
When a friend opens his door to me as I arrive as her guest for the evening, I
move effortlessly and guilelessly through the door as a boundary in the form of an open threshold. When I enter Mexico from the U.S. as an American citizen, I
am waved through, and the very wall that has been constructed to stop human traffic from the other direction is opened to me. A boundary presents itself to me as something I find rather than construct (even it has been built by human labor, I move through it as if it were part of the natural landscape). This is why its most frequent exemplar is found in the realm of physical nature or biological beingfor instance, in the permeable membranes of tissues in the animal body. Fluids flow across these membranes as if in their own medium, perhaps slowed down for the moment but nonetheless facilitated in their overall motion through a given part of the body they are meant to traverse in the successful sustenance of life. They are not structures determined by previous agreements, much less imposed upon the organism by fiat -as are borders on the land they serve to delimit -but, rather, they change in shape and form to suit the rhythm and pace and volume of circulating fluids. Unlike borders, they are undetachable from their organic base: where borders find their most acute existence in verbal descriptions and cartographic representations, boundaries are most fully instantiated in natural substances -and are, as a consequence, difficult to map in images or describe in words. Nevertheless, boundaries remain edges of a certain definite sort: they are found at the limits of things and more particularly on their surfaces. They may lack the neatness and objective determinability of borders as edges, but they are edge phenomena of their own sort.
Let me propose forthwith that Bachelard's notion of the instant in time is akin to the boundary in space --just as the abstract now of punctiform time is the correlate of a spatial border. A double parallel is here in operation. Here I will focus only on the first pair of terms, the instant and the boundary, in order to see where they converge -thus also to discern where they depart from each other.
My strategy is to pick out three of the leading traits Bachelard attributes to the instant -namely, novelty, commencement, and verticality -and to see how these play out for the edges that are at play in boundaries:
novelty: just as every instant on Bachelard's assessment is not only new but radically new, so every successive boundary-like edge represents a unique emergence in the spatial realm. Thus, for instance, the exact form of the pores in a particular membrane is always altering; however regular it may be, it is not strictly static but varies in the shape of its opening continually -and the action of opening itself is changing all the time: it opens and re-opens at its own rate, even if it fits within large biorhythms that are themselves chartable if not always precisely predictable. In this sense, the edges of the openings arise by actions of "new birth" each and every time, tightening and expanding in ever different ways, however subtle the differences may be. The same is true of the edges of the U.S. -Mexico boundary, La Frontera, as I approach it from the north as an in it and through it, but they do not go on happening indefinitely; they settle down, and when they do a boundary is formed, an edge established -an edge in a more capacious stretch of time, whether this be a day or a year or a millenium.
(And these latter have their own edges in the form of the boundaries of what we call "eras" or "epochs" or "ages.")
There are further wrinkles in the face of the temporal field. Just as we say that we edge away from certain events, so we also edge toward them. As we begin to leave Chicago at the end of this meeting, we will feel ourselves to be on 7 "The openness of this Open, that is, truth, can be what it is, namely, this openness, only if and as long as it establishes itself within its Open" (Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry Language Truth, tr. A. Hofstadter [New York: Harpers, 1971 ], p. 59, his italics). See also ibid., p. 47: "The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people."
its far edge -much as today, the first day (and the first official session!) we sense ourselves getting into the event, edging into it gingerly. As we move toward the middle of our time here -not a precise point but a stretcj situated somewhere tomorrow afternoon or evening -we will experience ourselves "in the midst" of SPEP, that is, in a valley of time whose edges are at once before and after us in roughly equal measure. This bivalent circumstance presents yet another edgestructure of being in time: being between events or times. (Notice that here we can use these terms interchangeably: time has become event, and events are the most timeful or timelike units of our experience here together.) Likewise, yesterday, we were somewhere before this meeting in Chicago, just as next Sunday or Monday we shall be after it. Thus, we can be on either side of an event, in the midst of it, or coming into (or leaving) its purview. All these structures depend for their existence on edges in time that act like boundaries.
Not only is there a proliferation of such edges -I am convinced that we could describe still others such as the edges at play in meeting people at this gathering (i.e., greeting them, departing from them, etc.) -but their presence is continual in our lives. We live in a virtual edge-world at all times. The same is not true of instants, despite Bachelard's strong claim to the contrary. For one thing, there are no "instants in space": that is to say, I cannot reverse the formula I have just been investigating, edges in time, to speak of their exact equivalent in space. Instants belong exclusively to temporality, and cannot be extended to the realm of space, not even metaphorically (or is so, the metaphor will jar rather than fit). For another, instants themselves arise within the immediate context of events, and in particular they occur within the edges of those events. As a spatiotemporal term -always having both modalities at once -"event" accommodates edge and instant alike. But it does so only by allowing edges to encompass instants: to enclose them as their encircling internal horizons.
Instants are indeed everything Bachelard claimed of them -radically novel, surprising, flashing up, starting up -but they are this only within the edges of the events to which they belong. This is so despite the fact that these edges themselves, insofar as they are boundaries, display some of the same traits.
But to share same or similar traits is not to belong to the other kind of thing, much less to be this kind.
There are no wholly unattached or isolated instants, as Bachelard is The shower of instants, whatever their provenance, certainly does not configure as a nacheinander succession (as in the myth of the now-series, wedded as it is to the time-line); but it is also not an entirely unruly arrray, coming from nowhere and going nowhere. The panoply of spontaneous, luminous appearings that instants present us with is situated within the edges of the events in which they inhere. The situatedness can be -often is -quite subtle and not marked as such (were it to be strictly marked, we would be dealing with edges that are borders); but the subtlety does not detract from the fact that edges, acting as boundaries, provide the arena of the instantaneous. The edges that matter offer holding operations that, instead of arising forthrightly (as do instants themselves in their leaping forth), are comparatively subdued but no less forceful for being implied rather than presented as such. around Chicago, etc.). The end of this meeting will edge out toward closure on that day, but no exact hour can be given for when that day will end. It will end, but we do not know just where its edge will be found.
Meanwhile, all the while, instants will have happened -instants as freely arisen as they are unpredictable. Just as Bachelard insisted, they will sally forth to surprise us in their sheer singularity. But they will do so only as enclosed within the boundaries furnished by the events that are their carriers -by the edges of these events: edges that act to embrace them, even as edges and instants alike are subtended by the history that is in the making as their common matrix.
